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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICIA BUCZYNSKI,
Petitioner/ Appellant,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH, and UTAH STATE
UNIVERSITY,
Respondents/ Appellee.

Case No. 940544

Priority Number 15

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a decision by the Industrial Commission of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue to be determined is whether appellant was in course and scope
of her employment at the time of her injury.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is correctness. Walls v. Industrial Commission,
857 P. 2d 964,966-8 (Utah App. 1993).

ADDITIONAL FACTS

1. Applicant, and her companion, Diane Valencia, lived in
McGaheysville, Virginia from July 1988, to January 1991. Applicant was
employed during this time at James Madison University, (hereinafter JMU).
They moved from there when Ms. Buczynski accepted employment with Utah
State University (hereinafter USU). (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order hereinafter Order, at pages 2, 7).1
2. Prior to leaving on the trip to McGaheysville, applicant was in
"constant conflict with... the people ... she worked with ... and was obsessive
about it" (T. at p. 168)
3. Applicant was scheduled to participate in a "poster presentation" at a
conference in Baltimore, Maryland beginning March 27,1992. A poster
presentation is where a large number of people gather in a conference room and
make themselves available to answer questions on a paper they have written.
4. The paper applicant was to present at the conference had been
accepted and approved by the conference sponsor in January of 1991. (R. at p.
167)
5. While it is common to do last minute preparations for a poster
presentation, most of the work is done well in advance. (T. at pages 336, 353)

1

The Order is found in the record at pages 89-105. References herein are to the page ntimbers of
the Order itself and not the record.

2

6. Applicant and Ms. Valencia flew to Washington, DC on March 24,1992
where they rented a car and drove 100 miles South to McGaheysville. They
remained there until March 27th when they drove to Baltimore. (Order at p. 2)
7. Applicant testified that airfare considerations were part of the reason
for the trip to McGaheysville, but that the main reason for her diversion "was to
prepare" for the presentation at the conference. (T. at p. 51) The record is
devoid of any other evidence substantiating applicant's claim that she received a
lower fare by leaving on Tuesday the 24th, as opposed to Thursday the 26th or
Friday, the 27th.
8. All of the materials applicant needed to read in preparation for her
presentation were available to her either at the USU library or through its
interlibrary loan program. It takes between a few hours and "two to three days"
to receive materials through the interlibrary loan program. (T. pages 348-352)
9. Applicant's supervisor, Professor Bertoch, testified that it is the policy
of USU to encourage employees to save money by obtaining lower airfares. (T.
at p. 335) He was unaware that she was leaving early either for airfare
considerations or her claim that she wanted to do research at JMU. He testified
that he would not have approved the early departure for either of these reasons.
(T. at p. 323) He approved the early departure because he believed applicant
was going to remain in Washington, DC to seek information about federal grant
money that might be available to USU. (T. at pages 326-327, 338-339)
11. Applicant did not seek reimbursement for expenses incurred during
her stay in McGaheysville. (R. at pages 157-159)
3

12. Applicant's position at USU allowed her to perform many of her work
activities away from campus. In addition to the classes she taught, applicant
was required to be available for some regular office hours. The rest of the time
she could work wherever she wished. She maintained an office in her home and
commonly worked there. (T. at pages 164-166)
13. After going out to dinner Thursday evening with Ms. Valencia, they
returned to the hotel and went downstairs to use the hotel hot tub. The injury
occurred as she was exiting the hot tub. She was performing no work related
activities at the time. (T. at pages 203-205)
14. Three of applicant's neighbors testified that applicant "is not a
trustworthy individual and that she has a reputation in her immediate
community of being dishonest in her dealings with others/' (Order at p. 15)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Applicants entire three day trip to McGaheysville was a distinct
departure from her authorized business trip. Because of her occupation as a
college professor she was allowed elasticity in where and when she performed
many of her job assignments. By electing to take some work with her to
McGaheysville she can not turn a personal trip into part of the business trip since
the work done was merely incidental to her true purpose. Even if the entire trip
to McGaheysville is not seen as a distinct departure, her activities at the time of
the accident, exiting from the hotel hot tub, were.
Before and after the accident, applicant engaged in a pattern of deception.
She omitted to tell her employer of her plans to go to McGaheysville and did not
4

seek reimbursement for her expenses while there, she was described by her
neighbors as being untrustworthy and dishonest, she displayed behavior
consistent with symptom magnification and she described an "injury" that
occurred on December 21,1992 that was entirely unbelievable. The
Administrative Law Judge heard 14 hours of testimony, reviewed hundreds of
pages of medical records and documents and was in the best position to judge
the applicant's credibility. He found that her testimony and actions were self
serving and contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Ms. Buczynski was not acting in the scope of her employment as to the
March 26,1992 accident and that the December 21,1992 "accident" did not occur
at all. The Order of the Industrial Commission should be upheld.

ARGUMENT
I. APPLLICANT'S ACCIDENT DID NOT
ARISE OUT OF NOR WAS IT IN THE
COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT
In order for a worker's compensation accident to be compensable, it must
arise out of and occur in the course of employment (Utah Code Annotated 35-145,1988.) The two separate clauses in this phrase; "arising out of" and "in the
course o f employment were made conjunctive under the 1988 amendments to
the Workers Compensation Act Therefore, a claimant must meet both
requirements. Prior to that, the provisions were disjunctive and the claimant
was required to meet only one or the other.
[T]he requirement that the accident arise in the course of the
employment is satisfied if it occurs while the employee is
5

rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or
doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place
where he was authorized to render such service. M & K Corp. v.
Industrial Commission 189 P2d 132 (Utah 1948).
The reason for requiring that an employee to be rendering service at an
authorized time and place was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in a case
involving the "going and coming rule."
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer
for conduct of its employees over which it has no control and
from which it derives no benefit Therefore, the major focus in
determining whether or not the general rules should apply in a
given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his control
over the conduct Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company, 801 P2d 934 (1989), at p. 937. [emphasis supplied]

In this case, applicant was injured while she was exiting from a hot tub
while on a personal vacation to McGaheysville, Virginia. She was not in the
process of performing any service to her employer, nor was she in a place where
she "was authorized to render such service/' She was injured in an accident
which did not arise out of her employment, or in the course of her employment
Her employer received no benefit from her trip to McGaheysville, was unaware
of her intention to travel to there, and exercised no control over her conduct
while there.
A. APPLICANT'S TRIP TO McGAHEYSVILLE
WAS A DISTINCT DEPARTURE
FROM HER AUTHORIZED BUSINESS TRIP
An exception to the course of employment portion of the rule has been
carved out in the case of the traveling employee.

6

Employees whose work entails travel away from the
employer's premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be
within the course of their employment continuously during the
trip, except when a distinct departure] on a personal errand is
shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in
hotels or eating in restaurants away from home are usually held
compensable. 1A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law
Section 25.00 (1985) [emphasis supplied]
This is known as the "continuous coverage rule." Since the employee is
required to be away from home, certain necessary activities which would
otherwise be outside the scope of employment, are covered. Coverage is limited
to situations where the employee was engaged in "activities reasonably required
for personal health and comfort" Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Orgon, 721
S.W.2d 572 (Texas App. 1986). The classic example of a necessary activity is the
employee who dies in a hotel fire while sleeping in his room. Although the
death did not arise from or in the course of employment, courts reason that
since sleeping in the hotel is necessary to the business function, the accident
occurred at a "time when and the place where [the employee] was authorized
to" be. By requiring the overnight stay, the employer is exercising control over
the employee and thereby exposing him to risk to which he would not
otherwise have been exposed. The employer is also receiving a "benefit7' from
the employee's presence at the hotel as the overnight stay is necessary for
business. (See Larson, § 25.00) Under the same theory, coverage has been
extended to include injuries which occur when an employee is eating in a
restaurant or traveling to or from the restaurant, is in the performance of his
daily ablutions, as in Orgon, supra and in some cases, while exercising, see Gray
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v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 475 So.2d 1288 (Florida (1985). However, the continuous
coverage rule has never been extended to include injuries that occur when a
"distinct [departure] on a personal errand is shown/' Larson, supra.
Taking advantage of a business trip by "tacking" a three day vacation
onto either end of the trip will not provide coverage for injuries which occur
during the vacation portion of the trip. In Yorkin, v. Volvo Distributing Co., 363
A2d 908 (New Jersey, 1976), the facts were very similar to the facts here:
The employee had been attending a convention in Miami
Beach, Florida., He did not return to his home or place of
employment in N. J. following the termination of the convention on
Thursday. Instead, by special and extraordinary permission
granted at his request, he was permitted to remain in Florida,
staying with relatives and at his own expense until Sunday. On
Saturday, as he was standing in the ocean surf, he was struck in the
head by a belligerent pelican and the injury ensued....
The court held the injury was not work related.
We are satisfied that a three day personal vacation tacked
onto the end of the convention removes an injury occurring during
that period from the course of employment Id. at p. 908
Ms. Buczynski's three day trip to McGaheysville was a vacation tacked
onto the beginning of a business trip and any injury she sustained is not
compensable.

APPLICANT'S ACTIONS SHOW THAT
SHE HERSELF DID NOT CONSIDER THE TRIP
TO McGAHEYSVILLE TO BE WORK RELATED.
The travel voucher applicant submitted for advance approval for her trip
indicated that the purpose for the trip was the delivery of a paper in Baltimore,
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"flying into Washington, D C " (R p. 160) The voucher was prepared by
applicant, typed by Karen Ranson, the department secretary, and approved by
Professor Bertoch. Although applicant indicated she was "flying into
Washington, DC," she failed to tell either of them that her intended destination
was McGaheysville, Virginia.
Upon her return, applicant submitted receipts for expenses for which she
was seeking reimbursement Among them were ten receipts for meals and two
for snacks. Of the twelve receipts, ten bear dates between March 27th and March
30th the dates of the actual conference. (R p. 159) The other two have no date. (R
p. 158) Applicant only sought reimbursement for meals on dates of the actual
conference in Baltimore. She also submitted a request for reimbursement for her
lodging in Baltimore while at the conference. (R p. 157) But she submitted no
request for reimbursement for her lodging while in McGaheysville. Applicant
did request reimbursement for mileage but that was for travel between Logan
and the Salt Lake International Airport and not for the trip to McGaheysville. (R
p. 160)
If the intention of her trip to McGaheysville was purely, or even
primarily, business in nature, she should have informed her employer in
advance and she would have sought reimbursement for expenses while there.
Since applicant has made no attempt to explain these suspicious omissions, the
Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) was entirely justified in weighing
this in light of the rest of the evidence and concluding that applicant was on a
personal diversion from the business trip.
9

THE EMPLOYER DID NOT AUTHORIZE,
DIRECT OR REQUIRE APPLICANT
TO BE IN McGAHEYSVILLE

Applicant asserts in her brief that her extended stay at McGaheysville
"took place not only with the knowledge but the active encouragement of
applicant's employer.../' (Applicant's brief p. 9) This allegation is not
supported by the record. It was clearly established that her employer had no
knowledge of her intentions to travel to McGaheysville. Applicant's travel
voucher showed that her destination was Washington, DC, some 50 miles from
the convention site in Baltimore. Her employer assumed, perhaps because he
was actively misled by Ms. Buczynski, that Washington, DC was her destination
for the first three days of her trip and that she would be staying there until the
conference to investigate the possibilities of obtaining federal grant money for
USU.
Her employer did nothing to "actively encourage" her to go to
McGaheysville. Professor Bertoch testified that it is the policy of USU to
encourage its employees to obtain the least expensive air fare possible. There
was no evidence that he knew this was Ms. Buczynski's alleged reason for going
to McGaheysville. Because the university policy is one of frugality does not
mean that an employee can tack a three day personal vacation onto a business
trip and expect all injuries sustained to be compensable.

10

APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES IN ACCOMODATING
WORK AWAY FROM THE CAMPUS OF
HER EMPLOYER SERVED A PERSONAL
AS OPPOSED TO BUSINESS PURPOSE.
Applicant attempted to create a business purpose for the excursion to
McGaheysville by taking work with her. According to the testimony of Diane
Valencia, applicant did the same type of work those three days in
McGaheysville as she routinely did when at home. In addition, the two of them
engaged in many "vacation" type activities; they visited old friends in the area,
went shopping, visited a winery, and spent their evenings eating out and
returning to the hotel to sit in the hot tub. The only thing that made the trip to
McGaheysville different from applicant's usual work routine was her alleged use
of the JMU library. Her alleged use of this library became a point of dispute at
the hearing when applicant said she "basically" went to McGaheysville to do
research for her upcoming presentation.
Ms. Buczynski testified that she did use the library at JMU for research
purposes and maintains that Ms. Valencia's testimony supports that claim. That
is a mischaracterization of Ms. Valencia's testimony. Ms. Valencia testified that
on two occasions she drove applicant to JMU where she dropped her off and
picked her up later. When asked at the hearing if she knew "if Pat was doing
research ... in Virginia," Ms. Valencia stated "I wasn't with her, so I couldn't
answer that" The ALJ found that "[a] host of other activities could be imagined
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which would plausibly explain applicant's visits to JMU, such as visiting friends
and acquaintances on the JMU faculty/' (Order at p. 8)
It was unnecessary for applicant to travel to McGaheysville to do
research. Applicant presented no evidence that research materials were
available at JMU that were not available at USU. Applicant's supervisor,
Professor Bertoch testified that many resources applicant might have been
looking for were in fact available at USU and that all resources were available
through the interlibrary loan program at USU. (T. at pages 348-352)
Applicant's paper was accepted for presentation in January of 1991. The
conference was the end of March. The trip to Baltimore and McGaheysville was
planned months in advance. Ms. Buczynski testified that she knew all the
materials she needed to prepare for her presentation were available through the
interlibrary loan program. She went to McGaheysville to read these materials
because "when you're going out of state [the interlibrary loan program] takes
quite a bit of time to get these resources...." (T. at p. 52) The unrebutted
testimony of Professor Bertoch was that an interlibrary loan request takes
between a few hours and a few days to be filled. Ms. Buczynski seems to argue
that inasmuch as she was unwilling to request the materials a few days in
advance, her employer should have sanctioned the trip to JMU.
The ALJ found that the trip to McGaheysville was for personal, not
business purposes. Applicant argues in her brief "it was error for the ALJ to
characterize the applicant's stay [there] as a personal vacation" because she did
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research in McGaheysville. The ALJ cited eight separate reasons for his finding.
Only the last reason challenged applicant's assertion that she was engaged in
research.
Other reasons for the ALJ's finding are set forth on pages 7-8 of the Order.
They include: applicant and her companion had previously lived in the area and
engaged in "personal" activities such as visiting friends and sightseeing; the
excursion had been planned months in advance; applicant's conduct before and
after the trip demonstrate her own belief that she was not on university business
at the time; and since applicant's testimony was found to be self serving and
lacking in credibility, her unsubstantiated assertions about the trip had to be
discounted or ignored.
The most compelling reason, according to the ALJ, was that a college
professor, while required to do scholarly research, receives great personal
benefit from the publication of their work. Applicant, for personal convenience,
often performed this research away from the university campus. By taking work
with her to McGaheysville, applicant could not turn a three day diversion from
the conference site into an extension of the business trip. That reason alone,
according to the ALJ, would warrant a finding that the trip to McGaheysville
was "personal in its motivation and purpose from start to finish, and that the
work activities engaged in during this diversion were merely 'incidental and
adjunctive' thereto." (Order at p. 6)
Professor Larson notes that employees who, for reasons of personal
convenience, take work away from the employer's premises, are not acting at the
13

request or direction of their employers and are thus engaged in personal
activities while away from the office. (See Larson's Workers Compensation Desk
Edition sections 18.33 and 18.34). The California Supreme Court phrased it
succinctly in Wilson v. Workers Comp. App. Bd., 545 P.2d 225 (CA1976) at p.
227 holding that "serving the employee's own convenience in selecting an offpremise place to work is a personal and not a business purpose."
That was the holding in Rowan v. University of Nebraska, 299 N.W.2d
774 (Nebraska 1980). Rowan was an art professor at the University. One of his
job assignments was to continue to produce art while teaching. A requirement
not unlike publishing and/or presenting papers in other disciplines. Rowan had
for a time sculpted in his office at the University but later moved to a studio
located in a building adjacent to his home. One day while he was working in his
studio, he climbed a ladder to open a window. The window was stuck, and as
he pulled harder to open it, he lost his balance and fell from the ladder. In
denying compensation, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the employer
was not "required to assume the risk incidental to a defective window" in the
professor's private home studio simply because the employee elected to do work
at home for reasons of personal convenience. In so holding, the Nebraska court
stated:
The plaintiff was in a situation similar to that of an
employee who was required to satisfy certain requirements as part
of the employment but was at liberty to choose the time and place
where he would accomplish the work. In such a situation, the
activity performed by the employee is generally considered to be

14

of but an incidental benefit to the employer and not covered by
the compensation act Id. at p. 775 [emphasis supplied]

The same reasoning applies to the instant case even though Rowan was
working in his home and not out of town. When an employee is at liberty to
take his work away from the office for personal convenience, the employee is not
covered continuously while at the site where s/he chose to perform the work.
An exception to this has been recognized when the employee is actually
performing work related duties at the time of the accident and the injury is
caused by an agent associated with the job, such as a police officer injured while
cleaning his gun at home. Applicant here was not working while in the hot tub
nor was using the hot tub associated with her employment
The facts here are strikingly similar to the facts in Virginia Polytechnic
Institute v. Wood, 369 S. E.2d 376 (Va.App. 1987). There, Wood was scheduled
to present a paper at a professional conference. She was a avid bicyclist and flew
to the site of the conference one day early with the intention of bicycling to a
campsite 42 miles from the airport "Once at the campsite, she planned to make
final preparation in solitude for her presentation/' Id at p. 377 She was injured
while riding her bike to the campsite.
Her supervisor testified that she "had considerable latitude in making all
decisions associated with her work and research ... and although her travel plan
had not been approved in advance, he would have done so had he had the
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opportunity to consider it" Id. at p. 378. The Court accepted the Commission's
finding that the excursion to the camp site was work related noting that,
[t]he Commission based its finding, in part, upon the fact
that Wood's alternate travel and lodging arrangements would save
[the employer] money, a finding which we find difficult to accept
in view of the additional travel days and expenses involved.
Nevertheless, for our purposes we accept the Commission's finding
that her sole purpose in going to the campsite was work related.
Id. at p. 379

Even finding that the excursion to the campsite was work related, the
Virginia Court found that the Commission had erred in allowing coverage.
We need not consider or decide whether Wood would have
been in the course of her employment after she arrived at the
campsite and while preparing her presentation....
The present case is a situation where an employee with
broad discretion in how and when and, to some extent, where he
work is to be performed chooses to do a work related task at a
location remote from her customary and usual place of
employment That Wood chose a campsite near Las Vegas to make
her preparation is immaterial. Had she chosen a campground
near [her home] or a solitary retreat at any location, whether
authorized or not, or had she been on her way to her office ... the
same result would obtain. Id at p. 380
In finding that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of her
employment, the court held that the continuous coverage rule has no application
to employees who are free to do their work where and when they wish. Even if
the trip would have been approved in advance, as the employer in Wood
testified.
Applicant cites Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256
(Utah 1980) in support of her position that her excursion to McGaheysville was
work related. This is a very interesting and tortured reading of that case.
16

Martinson was the vice president of the defendant insurance company who
spent a significant part of his time contacting customers. The director of the
Kimball Art Center in Park City, Robert Williams, was a personal friend of
Martinson's and the Center had purchased a policy from him. Williams invited
Martinson to attend the opening of the Art Center and to consult with him
regarding the adequacy of their insurance policy. Martinson drove to Park City,
spent the evening "socializing" with Williams and his wife and spent the night
in their condominium.
Before he left the next day, Martinson and Williams agreed to increase the
insurance which Martinson confirmed by a telephone call to the insurance
company. The Supreme Court found it "noteworthy ... that the amount of
additional coverage was based on inventory records of the art center, which had
previously been sent to [Martinson's] Salt Lake office, and that the business
about it did not require any personal inspection of the exhibits by [Martinson]."
Id. at p. 257.
That afternoon Martinson was injured in an automobile accident on his
way home to Salt Lake City. Martinson claimed that he was in the performance
of his employment duties when injured and was entitled to benefits. The
Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reasoned:
To maintain actuarial soundness and integrity of workmen's
compensation systems, it is essential that premiums be collected to
cover the risks involved. The coverage does not, and as a practical
matter, cannot extend to any injury done to an employee
wherever and whenever it happens, but is limited to accidental
injuries which occur in the course of or arise out of the
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performance of his duties. A special problem exists in some
occupations such as salesmen, where there is elasticity both as to
the place and hours of such performance; and wherein it is
comparatively easy for an employee, who may suffer an injury at
practically any time or place, to contrive a report of being involved
in business in order to bring himself under coverage. At pages 257258 [emphasis supplied]
The Court went on to note that in some occupations social pleasures or
diversions can be combined with the performance of work and that alone should
not preclude coverage.
In such situations, where problems arise as to coverage, one
of the tests sometimes applied is whether such a trip is one which
someone else would have had to make for the employer at some
time if the claimant had n o t Another ... test... is whether the
paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of the trip or
other activity is to serve the employer's interest, and the social
aspects, or other diversion for one's own interest, is merely
adjunctive thereto....
[If] the predominant motivation... is ... social... or
personal... even though there may be some transaction of
business or performance of duty merely incidental or adjunctive
thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the course of
his employment; and where there is uncertainty ... that should be
resolved by the Commission, as the trier of the facts. At p. 258
[emphasis supplied]
In upholding the Commission, the Court was persuaded by the fact that
the insurance could have been increased without anyone having left the Salt
Lake office.
Applicant argues that Martinson supports her position that the entire trip,
to Baltimore and McGaheysville should be covered because her paramount
motivation was the delivery of the poster presentation. This ignores the fact that
the accident occurred on a three day diversion from the business trip. This
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diversion does not fall within the two tests described in Martinson. The work
applicant did while on the diversion to McGaheysville could have been done on
the USU campus and her paramount or predominant motivation was social, not
serving her employer's interests. It appears that Ms. Buczynski did just what the
Supreme Court feared, she contrived "a report of being involved in business in
order to bring [herself] under coverage."
Applicant also cites Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983). There the deceased was driving home from the
Governor's Ball at the time of the accident He attended the ball at the invitation
of his boss with the expectation that they would discuss work. Although no
business was in fact discussed, the Supreme Court found that since the
deceased's "paramount or predominant motivation and purpose in making the
trip was to serve the interest o f his employer, and he was "entirely justified in
inferring a business purpose from the invitation/' the Industrial Commission's
finding of coverage was upheld. At p. 89
The facts in Ogden are distinguishable from the facts here. The accident
did not occur during a diversion from the trip, the decedent was invited to
attend the function by and with his boss, and this was not a situation where
decedent took work away from his employer's premises for reasons of personal
convenience. As the ALJ pointed out
[t]o determine coverage in fOgden and Martinson] it was
necessary to decide if the activity for which the travel was required
was predominantly business or pleasure. In the case at hand, the
accident occurred during a personal diversion a substantial
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distance away from the business destination after the applicant had
arrived at the destination occasioned by the business travel. The
accident did not occur during the travel to or from that destination.
Order at p. 8
He went on to state that had Ms. Buczynski been injured while traveling
between her home in Logan and Washington, DC, it would have been
reasonable to have found her to be in the course of her employment
To make the facts in Ogden similar to the facts here, hypothesize that the
decedent was injured while driving to Logan for personal reasons prior to the
Governor's Ball. Intending to proceed directly to Salt Lake afterwards would
not have brought him within the coverage of workers compensation.
The rule denying coverage to employees who are allowed to perform
work away from the office for personal convenience is in keeping with the basic
principles of compensation law. To rule otherwise would work an injustice on
employers by making them liable for injuries that are not caused by the
employment. As the Supreme Court in Martinson feared employees could
ensure coverage for themselves during any vacation or personal activity simply
by electing to take some work with them. One of the byproducts of workers
compensation law has been to encourage employers to provide safe work
environments which result in fewer injuries and lower insurance premiums. If
an employee is covered while away from the office by taking work with him, the
employer would lose all control over the risk to which the employee is exposed.
The end result would likely be that employers would not allow off site work.
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For many types of employment this would create an inconvenience for both the
employee and the employer.

EVEN IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE ENTIRE TRIP TO
McGAHEYSVILLE WAS NOT A DIVERSION, THE
APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES AT THE TIME OF
THE ACCIDENT WERE NOT WORK RELATED
While Defendants believe the entire time spent in McGaheysville was a
diversion, it could also be said that the activities engaged in at the time of the
accident constituted a diversion as well. On the evening of the accident,
applicant and Ms. Valencia had gone out to dinner. When they returned, they
went to the hot tub in a public area of the hotel. Applicant was not performing
work at the time. She got out of the hot tub to get dressed, slipped on some
water, and fell. These activities were clearly for her "own pleasure and
gratification,... [not] beneficial or incidental to [her] employment and [hence]
constitute a stepping aside from the employment" Alexander Film Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 319 P2d 1074 (Colorado, 1957) at p. 1076.
While it is true that an employee who is away from home on a business
trip for her employer is in most circumstances under continuous workers
compensation coverage from the time he leaves until he returns home, there are
exceptions to this general rule. As was noted in Alexander:
Such an employee is in continuous employment, day and
night This does not mean that he can not step aside from his
employment for personal reasons, or reasons in no way connected
with his employment, just as might an ordinary employee working
on a schedule of hours at a fixed location. He might rob a bank; he
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might attend a dance; or he might engage in other activities equally
conceivable for his own pleasure and gratification, and ordinarily
none of these acts would be beneficial or incidental to his
employment and would constitute a stepping aside from the
employment
Such a stepping aside from employment was found in Silver Engineering
Works, Inc. v Simmons, 505 P2d 966 (Colorado). There, the decedent was in
Mexico on behalf of his employer. "Several days after arriving at El Dorado,
Mexico, and during the period when the plant was shut down for the Easter
weekend, the decedent, and several other employees, drove ... to a remote beach
to swim and fish. The decedent went swimming ... and met his death by
drowning/' At p 967. In finding that the decedent was not entitled to workers
compensation benefits, the Colorado Supreme Court discussed the continuous
coverage rule and the personal errand exception concluding that "the traveling
employee is as capable of departing on a personal errand as any other type of
employee, thereby losing the right to compensation benefits from accidents
occurring during such departures." At p 968. [emphasis supplied] The Court
held that "the decedent had indeed stepped aside from his employment and was
attending to a matter of personal recreation, which was beyond that necessary to
the normal ministration to needs of an employee on a business trip." Id at p. 968.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reached the same conclusion in Marbury v
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 577 NE2d 672 (Ohio, 1989). In that case,
Marbury was attending a conference in Baltimore, Maryland. The conference
met from 9:00 AM through 5:00 PM for six consecutive days. At 5:00 p m on one
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of the conference days, a bus tour of Washington, DC was made available to
conference participants. The cost of the tour was not included in the registration
fee. Marbury and her supervisor went on the tour. The parties disagreed about
whether or not business was discussed on the bus or if the supervisor
encouraged Marbuy to take the tour. Additionally, Marbury was reimbursed for
the tour but had characterized it as a "dinner meeting" as a brown bag meal was
served on the bus. Her employer testified that the tour would not have been
reimbursed had Marbury not misrepresented the expense.
At between 9:30 PM and 10:00 PM the bus made its last stop at a souvenir
shop. Marbury testified that she went into the souvenir shop to purchase a Tshirt for her daughter. The accident occurred when she was entered the shop.
In holding that the accident was not compensable, the Court noted that "[t]here
is no apparent benefit that [the employer] could have expected to receive from
Marbury7 s presence in the souvenir shop for the declared purpose of purchasing
a T-shirt for her daughter/' (Id at p. 673) and held that "reasonable minds can
only come to the conclusion that when she left the bus and entered a souvenir
shop in Washington for the purpose of purchasing a T-shirt for her daughter, she
was on a purely personal mission of her own, having nothing to do with her
employer's purposes and was therefore outside the course of her employment."
(Id. at p. 674)
The case of Perry v American Bakeries Co., 136 S.E.2d 643 (North
Carolina 1964) is more directly on point There, the employee was attending a
sales meeting in a hotel away from home. All the hotel expenses were paid for
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by the employer. On the night of the accident, all employees in attendance were
invited to a social hour after which the claimant and another employee went to
dinner. After dinner, claimant sustained a diving injury while swimming in the
hotel's swimming pool. The Court held that swimming was not sufficiently
connected to the sales meeting and benefits were denied.
Applicant's use of the hot tub at the time of the accident is not unlike
Perry's use of the swimming pool. It should also be noted that the court in Perry
emphasized the fact that the employer was paying for lodgings at the hotel.
Here, USU did not Applicant paid for her own hotel room and all of her
expenses while in McGaheysville.
A like result was found in Brownlee, v. Wetterau Food Services, et al., 339
S.E.2d 694 (South Carolina, 1986). There the employee, Brownlee, was attending
an out of state training seminar. The seminar was held between 7:00 a.m. and
10:00 p.m. Brownlee and three other employees died in an automobile accident
at 1:55 a.m. after having attended a movie. In holding the accident was not job
related, the Court said:
Absent... is evidence that Brownlee died while attending
either a job related function or employer-sponsored event. Rather
... Brownlee died while engaged in an outing that occurred after
work, away from the premises of his employer, and at a time when
his employer exercised no control over his activities. Id at p. 695
In all four of these cases, the courts found that the employee was on a
diversion from work or personal comfort activities taking them out of the
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continuous coverage rule. Likewise, applicant's use of the hot tub was a clear
diversion.
The cases cited by applicant in her brief are disi i njjuishal'>le> from lit*1 I acts
here. In Orgon, the claimant was performing his morning ablutions when he
wa n Iot 1 «i iJ r 1111*., of water He reached for the glass which dropped from his
hand. When he tried to catch it, it shattered in his hand. The Texas court noted
that
[t]he merit of the continuous coverage principle is especially
apparent from the facts in this case. But for the business-related
necessity of sleeping overnight in an out-of-town hotel room,
Orgon would have awakened on the day in question in the comfort
and security of familiar surroundings; he would have been
unhurried; and he would have used a paper cup to get his usual
drink of water. Id. at p. 575
Orgon was engaged in an activity that would have of necessity been
p e r l oi" ine< 11 *i I f i< > i m j , B<1111 jt* i n strange surroundings as a result of his
employment, added a hazard to a necessary function. There is no necessity in
being in the hot tub.
In Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 475 So.2d 1288 (Florida (1985) the
claimant was a flight attendant staying at a hotel on a scheduled two day
layover

I le hi >k<» his nose while playing basketball at the YMCA. His

employer paid for his hotel accommodations and guests of the hotel were
entitled to use the YMCA facilities. Gray "testified that he was playing
basketball to prepare loi an (employer] sponsored basketball tournament...
[and]... that he also tried to exercise during all lay-overs, saying that Eastern
requires flight attendants to stay in good physical condition." In allowing
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benefits, the Florida court held that participating in a sports activity under the
facts in that case, constituted an activity "reasonably required for personal health
and comfort" Id. at p. 1289
Applicant here was not performing any function necessary to daily living
such as obtaining exercise or getting a drink of water. She was relaxing in a hot
tub which can no be said to be "required" for personal health. This was
correctly construed by the ALJ and the Industrial Commission as a distinct
departure on a personal errand not unlike buying souvenirs, swimming at the
beach or in the hotel swimming pool, or going to a movie.

THE INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE PROVED THAT
APPLICANT'S TESTIMONY WAS INCONSISTENT,
UNBELIEVABLE AND SELF SERVING
Applicant's first accident was on March 26,1992. She prepared and filed
an Employee's First Report of Injury Form on April 8,1992. (R. at p. 3) and saw
numerous doctors over the course of the next two and one half months. It was
not until her visit to Dr. Reichert on June 6,1992 that she first mentioned that she
had also suffered an injury to her head and neck. (Order at p. 7)
Over the course of the next year and one half, applicant displayed
behavior consistent with symptom magnification. She portrayed herself to her
treating physicians as "a woman having great difficulty communicating with
others and performing the basic functions required of a university professor/'
(Order at p. 11) Although she wore a knee brace and, immediately prior to the
hearing in October of 1993, a neck brace, her day to day activities were
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inconsistent with a person suffering from the physical and mental limitations she
claimed were the result of the injury. (Order pages 12-13)
Three of her neighbors testified that she had a reputation in the
community of being untrustworthy and dishonest This evidence went
unrebutted* These Siimc vviltiesses, »iiid Ms. Valencia, tostifioiI Ihat applicanl
suffered an unrelated fall in February of 1993 which needed medical attention
but applicant refused stating that she was afraid it would hurt her chances of
winning this lawsuit against USU. (T. at pages 193-196)
Applicant was in "constant conflict with ... the people ... that she worked
with" and was "obsessive about it" immediately prior to the March 26,1992
incident (T. at p. 188) This may have provided the motivation for the
allegations made by applicant against her employer.
Applicai it also claimed that si: le "\ \ as fi irther injured in a separate
industrial injury on December 21,1992. Although this alleged accident is not
mentioned in her brief, it was referenced on the docketing statement and
deserves mention here. Applicant claimed, that on that da\ she w as standing it i
the doorway of Karen Ranson's office when Professor Bertoch violently jerked
the door" open

\ Itl: longl t on a utches at the time, applicant claimed that she had

to lean on her left knee and that she some how jerked her neck in an attempt to
prevent herself from falling. The door against she was leaning was glass and
easily seen through. It would have been impossible for Professor Kertoi ii no I lo
have seen her had he opened the door.
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Neither Professor Bertoch or Karen Ranson remember this event having
occurred. Applicant originally wanted to file assault and battery charges against
Professor Bertoch for what she considered was his violent opening of the door.
She claimed that as a result of this incident she severely injured her left knee (she
presented photographs that she claimed depicted her left knee badly bruised
from this) and that she herniated the disks in her neck necessitating surgery.
The Administrative Law Judge heard the testimony of all three parties who were
present, according to applicant, when this event occurred. The Judge found that
the testimony of Professor Bertoch and Ms. Ranson to be more credible and they
testified that nothing had occurred in any way similar to the event described by
applicant on that or any other day, even though applicant claimed she had been
talking to Ms. Ranson at the time and that Professor Bertoch was the alleged
"assailant" (Order p. 10)
Applicant has done nothing to explain her lack of candor before or during
the hearing. The record and the Order are replete with examples of
inconsistencies in her behavior and testimony. Her claims that she did research
at JMU, was injured on December 21,1992, or that she went to McGaheysville
early to obtain cheaper airfare were and should weighed in light of applicant's
other self serving statements and behavior and discounted or ignored.

NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCTED
TO SUPPORT APPLICANT'S CLAIM THAT
HER EARLY DEPARTURE RESULTED
IN A LOWER AIRFARE
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March 24,1992 fell on a Tuesday. The convention in Baltimore was from
March 27lh to Man h MP\ Friday through Monday. Most air lines offer a reduced
fare if travel includes a stay on a Saturday night Since Applicant was going to
stay over in Baltimore on Saturday, March 28th, there is no credible evidence to
support iliiii Ibe i (inclusion that her early departure resulted in a induction in
airfare. The only evidence tending to substantiate that Applicant saved her
employer money by going early is her own self serving testimony which was
found in several other particulars to be lacking in credibility. And that
testimony is not substantiated by air line industry standards.
V

he early departure in fact saved USU money, it

should be noted that Applicant had a personal reason for obtaining a lower
airfare. Applicant wanted Diane Valencia to accompany her on the trip for
purely personal reasons. Applicant was •

* ig Ms. V a I e n c i a a n d w a s I h u s

paying her fare out of her own funds. By arranging for a less expensive flight
for herself, she saved money in paying for Ms Valencia's flight as well.
The ALJ found that the purpose of the trip was purely personal and any
consideration of airfare was secondary, personal or non existent.
THE MAN DATE TO LIBERALLY CONSTRUE THE
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT CANNOT BE USED
TO EXTEND BENEFITS WHERE NONE WERE INTENDED
Applicant asserts that the rule requiring liberal construction and
application argues in favor of extending coverage to her injury

(See for

example, Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676). However, it is also well
settled 11 icil the liberality rule cannot be applied in such a way as to nullify
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provisions of the workers compensation act, or to reach a result favorable to the
employee at the expense of a reasonable and rational interpretation of statutory
language. (Bailey v. Lakewood Fire Protection Dist, 618 P.2d 716 (Colo. App.
1980); Security Trust v. Smith, 596 P.2d 248 (N. M. 1979)). As stated by the
Wyoming Supreme Court, "workers compensation statues are to be interpreted
liberally, but courts are not free under the guise of construction to extend the
beneficent purpose of the law to injuries that do not reasonably fall within the
reach of the language used/' Matter of Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815 (1983). Given
the facts of this case, it would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the
Utah Workers Compensation Act to shift the risk of injury during an employee's
vacation to the employer.

CONCLUSION
Applicant was on a distinct departure from her business trip when she
went to McGaheysville. Taking work with her and claiming to have done
research while there can not change this personal diversion into an extension of
the authorized business trip to Baltimore. Her activities when injured, using the
hot tub, did not arise out of or in the course of her employment. Her credibility
was severely challenged by her actions both before and after the accident and
her testimony was inconsistent, unbelievable and self serving. The Industrial
Commission found that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding of
compensability and should be upheld.
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